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# AC

I value morality since ought implies an obligation.Actions are expressions of an agent’s will and derive from their practical reason. If I cross the street to get bread, the only reason why we call that crossing the street is because my intention to get bread unifies all the different steps involved into one action. Any action can be divided up into an infinite number of smaller end states but the intentionality that we carry through the multiple steps unifies them. So, we can only evaluate intentions. Thus, look to practical reason, which gives us the ability to will something in accordance with our principles, i.e. to intend something. We are defined by our constitutive ability to reflect on our obligations and act on principles, **Korsgaard**:

Christine M. Korsgaard “Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals” 02/06/04

Rationality and intelligence are often confused. But at least as Kant understands **rationality**, they are not the same thing. Kant believed that human beings have developed [**is] a** specific **form of self-consciousness,** namely, **the ability to perceive**, and therefore to think about, **the grounds of our** beliefs and **actions as grounds.** Here’s what I mean: an animal who acts from instinct is conscious of the object of its fear or desire, and conscious of it as fearful or desirable, and so as to-be-avoided or to-be-sought. That is the ground of its action. But a rational animal is, in addition, conscious that she fears or desires the object, and that she is inclined to act in a certain way as a result. That’s what I mean by being conscious of the ground as a ground. So **as rational beings we are conscious of the principles on which we are inclined to act.** Because of this, we have the ability to ask ourselves whether we should act in the way that we are instinctively inclined to. We can say to ourselves: “I am inclined to do act-A for the sake of end-E. But should I?” **We [can]** have the ability to **question** whether the responses our incentives present to us as appropriate really are so, and therefore **whether we have reason for acting in the ways that they suggest.**

And even if they win the NC framework, if I win that intentionality unifies action, then all their offense must still be conceptualized through intents. Also, unintended harms can be solved for by extra-topical action since they’re not inherent to the maxim of the resolution, thus they’re irrelevant. Prefer a starting point of practical reason:

1. Physical facts and empirical realities, like desires and consequences, cannot be the basis of morality because we’re not responsible for descriptive characteristics of the world. Only a priori practical reason solves, **Furrow**:[[1]](#footnote-1)

This is because the source of human dignity is our capacity for freedom. We are distinguished from all other beings by our capacity to rationally choose our actions. If God, nature or other persons imposed moral[s] requirements on us, against our will, our freedom would be fatally compromised. What is more, if our moral decisions were not free but imposed on us, we would not be morally responsible for them, thus undermining the system of praise and blame that is central to our moral framework. Thus, according to Kant, the basic condition for moral agency is moral autonomy – the capacity that each of us has to impose moral constraints on ourselves. Thus far, Kant’s thrilling praise of moral freedom seems compatible with ethical egoism. If moral decisions are up to me then it would seem that I am free to choose in accordance with my self-interest. However, Kant goes on to argue that **I cannot achieve moral autonomy if desires**, emotions **and inclinations govern my moral judgements.** Kant was convinced that **nature is a mechanical system governed by deterministic, physical laws** – causal relationships determine the behaviour of plants, animals and inanimate objects. They have no capacity to choose. But human desires, emotions and inclinations are also part of that deterministic universe, since they are a function of our bodily nature. When we act in accordance with desires, emotions and inclinations, we are simply responding to physical urges much as an animal does. How can human beings escape this deterministic physical world? **The only way** we can **[to] exercise** our **freedom** and autonomy **is to rationally assess** our **actions independent**ly **of** our **desires**. Moral reasoning will set us free – free from desires **and** emotions that chain us to nature. In contexts where moral judgement is required, by reasoning independently of desires, I am imposing **[impose] moral principles on [ourselves]** myself. My actions are self-directed rather than caused by external forces. Kant is not arguing that we should never act on our desires or inclinations. In fact, most of the time we act on what he calls hypothetical imperatives, which involve desires. ‘If you want to earn money, go to work.’ ‘If you are afraid of tigers, then stay out of the jungle.’ These are perfectly acceptable as a basis for action. Actions based on these hypothetical imperatives have instrumental value – they get us something we want. But such actions have no moral value. **When our actions reflect only** our **desires** and inclinations, **and not** our capacity for moral **reason, they are not free and thus** they **have no moral worth, since morality requires freedom.**

2. When we look to an external authority or ask an ethical question, we can always question into infinite regression why we should act on that authority or rule. Only reason escapes this regress because if I ask “why should I look to reason?” I’m asking for a reason to obey reason which concedes its own authority.

Next, agents can act by and will universal rules that are valid for everybody. Rational agents must view themselves as the cause of their actions, which means they must identify with principles and cannot act on non-universal rules. **Korsgaard**:

Christine M. Korsgaard “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant”

The first step is this: [t]o conceive yourself as the cause of your actions is to identify with the principle of choice on which you act. **A rational will is** a self-conscious causality, and a self-conscious causality is **aware of itself as a cause.** To be aware of yourself as a cause is to identify yourself with something in the scenario that gives rise to the action, and this must be the princxiple of choice. For instance, **suppose** you experience a conflict of desire: **you** have a **desire** to do both **A and B,** and they are incompatible. **You have some principle which favors A** over B, **so you** exercise this principle, and you **choose** to do **A.** In this kind of case,you do not regard yourself as a mere passive spectator to the battle between A and B. **You regard the choice as yours,** as the product of your own activity, **because you regard the principle of choice as expressive**, or representative, **of yourself.** You must do so, for **the only alternative** to identifying with the principle of choice **is regarding the principle** of choice **as some third thing in you,** another force on a par with the incentives to do A and to do B, which happened to throw in its weight in favor of A, in a battle at which you were, after all, a mere passive spectator. **But then you are not the cause of the action.**

**And,** prefer this view because if rationality serves as the basis for normative claims, anything that is asserted to be a maxim must be universalizable because it’s arbitrary to reject a maxim for one person or circumstance while making it sufficient to guide other actions.

From universality it follows that violations of freedom are impermissible since one person extends their own freedom in acting while violating another person’s, generating a contradiction. But as individuals’ desires will always overlap, the state must enforce restrictions on agents’ autonomy. Thus, the standard is **consistency with a system of reciprocal constraints on equal outer freedom**. **Prefer** the standard since it’s a prerequisite to any other – no matter whether ends are good, freedom is necessary to pursue them. **And**, without freedom, moral decision making is meaningless. If a child stops bullying only because their parents scolded them and forced them to stop, there’s no way to evaluate the child as good or kind if they still harbored the same desires.

**I defend the resolution as a general principle.** I’ll grant further reasonable specifications so long as I’m not forced to abandon the AC’s maxim. To clarify, I’ll defend consequentialist impacts but they don’t link to the AC standard since I just need to show the aff’s maxim is consistent with the standard. The neg must ask about interps in CX to prevent misunderstandings so I meet an interp unless the neg asks me to comply and I refuse – prevents the neg from reading unfair binary interps that moot my AC, skewing time, and destroying substantive education.

Affirm:

1. It necessarily follows from the AC standard that the omnilateral will prevents violations of freedom and overlaps in desires. Different people have incompatible wants, meaning that there needs to be an overall will that can resolve between such conflicts. Limits on your independence that are equally applicable to each person is only possible through the omnilateral will, which counteracts the possibility of a violation of your freedom.

Implies you’d affirm – as state entities, public higher education ensuring free speech prevents contradictions in the sovereign’s ultimate purpose and initial instantiation, maintaining the omnilateral will’s legitimacy. **Suprenant**:[[2]](#footnote-2)

The second point is a bit less straightforward. His claim is that a sovereign that outlaws free speech creates a condition where his actions “put him in contradiction with himself.” This language is remarkably similar to what he uses in his moral theory to describe principles that violate the categorical imperative, Kant’s supreme principle of morality. In the Groundwork, Kant claims that when a principle of action fails when tested against the categorical imperative, it fails because something about that principle is contradictory. It may be the case that it is not possible to conceive of the action that comes about as a result of universalizing the underlying principle connected to the action (i.e., a contradiction in conception), or the result of universalizing the principle is self-defeating in some way (i.e., a contradiction in the will). In the case of the sovereign restricting freedom of the press, the contradiction appears to be more practical. Elsewhere Kant argues what justifies sovereign authority is that his actions are supposed to represent[ing] the united will of the people (MM 6:313). But a sovereign that denies free speech and otherwise undermines the conditions necessary to maintain a free society has made it impossible to gather the information needed to represent the will of the people appropriately. In this way, Kant sees any attempt by the sovereign to limit or otherwise suppress the free exchange of ideas, and, in particular, the exchange of ideas among the educated members of society (e.g., academics), as undermining his own authority.

Moreover, the term “constitutionally protected” means that by definition, state actors can’t restrict speech if it’s protected by the constitution. Since public colleges are state entities, they cannot restrict legally-permitted speech, so you’d definitionally affirm.

2. From the perspective of external freedom, immoral speech in itself has no bearing on my choice to act – my volition is independent and reflective of myself. **Varden**:[[3]](#footnote-3)

This distinction between internal and external use of choice and freedom explains why Kant maintains that most ways in which a person uses words in his interactions with others cannot be seen as involving wrongdoing from the point of view of right: “such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them, telling or promising them something, whether what he says is true and sincere or untrue and insincere” do not constitute wrongdoing because “it is entirely up to them [the listeners] whether they want to believe him or not” (6: 238). The utterance of words in space and time does not have the power to hinder anyone else’s external freedom, including depriving him of his means. Since words as such cannot exert physical power over people, it is impossible to use them as a means of coercion against another. For example, if you block my way, you coerce me by hindering my movements: you hinder my external freedom. If, however, you simply tell me not to move, you have done nothing coercive, nothing to hinder[ed] my external freedom, as I can simply walk pas[t]sed you. So, even though by means of your words, you attempt to influence my internal use of choice by providing me with possible reasons for acting, you accomplish nothing coercive. That is, you may wish that I take on your proposal for action, but you do nothing to force me to do so. Whether or not I choose to act on your suggestion is still entirely up to me. Therefore, you cannot choose for me. My choice to act on your words is beyond the reach of your words, as is any other means I might have. Indeed, even if what you suggest is the virtuous thing to do, your words are powerless with regard to making me act virtuously. Virtuous action requires not only that I act on the right maxims, but that I also do so because it is the right thing to do, or from duty. Because the choice of maxims (internal use of choice) and duty (internal freedom) are beyond the grasp of coercion, Kant holds that most uses of words, including immoral ones such as lying, cannot be seen as involving wrongdoing from the point of view of right.

Further, the Constitution permits speech to the extent that it does not physically endanger others – hence the impermissibility of screaming “fire” in a theater. That implies that you’d affirm. **Varden 2**:[[4]](#footnote-4)

Second, it is important to distinguish threats of coercion from merely immoral speech. When you threaten me, you tell me that you do not intend to interact rightfully with me in the future. Simply saying so does not deprive me of anything that is mine, of course, but if you are serious and have the ability to make a strike against me, that is, if you really are threatening me, then you intend to back up your words with physical force. When you really threaten me, neither are you uttering ‘empty words’ nor are you taking yourself to be doing so. For example, assume that instead of yielding to your threat, I begin to walk away. You then move forward to block my retreat. This signals your intention to follow through with the threat. In fact, you might engage in other acts to signal that the threat is not empty. Perhaps you crush my hat under your foot or take a baseball bat to my car. In cases like these the words contained in the threat no longer function merely as speech but take on the role of communicating an intended future wrongdoing against me. Hence, threats are not considered mere speech on this view.

Under a system of equal freedom, only hindrances to initial hindrances of freedom are permissible since they rectify the initial injustice and uphold the initial victim’s freedom– anything else violates the standard since action is only wrong if inconsistent with reciprocal limits on freedom.

Turns related to the insufficiency of counter speech aren’t relevant:

1. No matter their nature, speech codes destroy productive discourse that enable discussions that can actually change the college atmosphere. **ACLU**:[[5]](#footnote-5)

And the ACLU believes that all campuses should adhere to First Amendment principles becauseacademic freedom is a bedrockof educationin a free society. How much we value the right of free speech is put to its severest test when the speaker is someone we disagree with most.Speech thatdeeplyoffendsour moralityor is hostileto our way of lifewarrants the same constitutional protection as other speech because the right of free speechis indivisible: When oneof usis denied this right, all of us aredenied. Since its founding in 1920, the ACLU has fought for the free expression of all ideas, popular or unpopular. That's the constitutional mandate. Where racist, sexist and homophobic speech is concerned, the ACLU believes that more speech -- not less -- is the best revenge. This is particularly true at universities, whose mission is to facilitate learning through open debate and study, and to enlighten. Speech codes are not the way to go on campuses, where all views are entitled to be heard, explored, supportedor refuted. Besides, when hate is out in the open, people can see the problem.Then they can organizeeffectively tocounter bad attitudes, possibly change them,and forge solidarity againstthe forces ofintolerance**.** College administrators may find speech codes attractive as a quick fix, but as one critic put it: "Verbal purity is not social change."

2. Empirically, counter-speech solves hate speech. **Davidson**:[[6]](#footnote-6)

All experts agreed that negative speech creates awareness that surrounds a certain topic. They all noted that “good speech” surfaces to combat the “bad speech.” Humphrey notes that, “We have seen a lot of students stand up and say that this isn’t welcome in this community. It galvanized a movement that said we need to do better” (Appendix A). Den Otter notes something very similar, stating that, “I think any time that there’s some kind of racist incident on campus, people start talking about it. They’re made more aware of it” (Appendix B). And Loving advocates for people to not just stand idly while hate speech is taking place around them, that, “If racial slurs were met with more conversation, evil councils being remedied by good councils, then how long would that atmosphere remain on campus?” (Appendix C). The research shows that these suggestions and statements are true, if history is used as an indicator. Various incidents that have occurred, such as the California Polytechnic State University College Republicans Free Speech Wall, the Crops House Incident and the Charlie Hebdo Attacks have created movements against the negative speech that took place. Many times when “bad speech” shows its face, there are people who use “good speech” to combat the issue.

In addition, efficacy of counter speech can’t be relevant since they don’t test the maxim of the free speech, only its empirical instantiation, which wouldn’t be responsive to the claims I’ve made about the logical consistency of free speech and the intrinsic ability for free speech to avoid hindrances on freedom.

## U/V - Theory

Presume aff since affirming’s harder so a tie means I’m the better debater. Out of more than 12000 rounds during the course of the last year affs won over 7% fewer rounds.[[7]](#footnote-7) Prefer stats since they determine whether analytics actually end up skewing rounds in real rounds. Also, “Resolved” means firmly determined to do something, which means the res has already been proven true. This means you reject neg theory not weighted against side bias because otherwise aff abuse just rightfully rectifies the side bias.

To affirm means “**to say that something is true.**”[[8]](#footnote-8) To negate means **“to deny the truth of”** which impliestruth testing is the only paradigm consistent with textuality, which means it is the only paradigm or role of the ballot you have jurisdiction to use since when you sign the ballot you are saying the better debating was done by the aff. Prefer this ROB additionally on predictability since text is all we have coming into the round.

The neg must concede to the affirmative’s choice of role of the ballot for this round. Prefer this interp **A.** other interps allow the NC to introduce an entirely new layer that the 1AR cannot establish adequate footing on due to the 13-7 time skew of a 1AR restart, means we can’t engage under their new role of the ballot anyways **B.** only my interpretation permits substantive discussion since when the role of the ballot is contested, every single round becomes a procedural debate about what role of the ballot is preferable and **C.** switch side debate links turns reasons to prefer alternate roles of the ballot – my interp forces debaters to debate under different roles of the ballot increasing clash and depth because superficial responses aren’t made on multiple layers of the flow.

The formulation of intents is done through the structure wherein actors have benign intentions, known as the guise of the good, so every actor perceives of his actions and intends them as good, **Aquinas**:[[9]](#footnote-9)

**The will is a rational appetite.** Now **every appetite is** only **of something good.** The reason of this is that the appetite is nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards that thing. Now every inclination is to something like and suitable to the thing inclined... **But** it must be noted that, **since every inclination results from a form, the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature of things,** while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or rational appetite, **which we call the will**, follows from an apprehended form. **Therefore,** just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a thing; so **the** animal or **voluntary appetite tends to a[n] [apprehended] good** which is apprehended. **Consequently, in order that the will tend to anything, it is requisite**, not that this be good in very truth, but **that it be apprehended as good.**

Redefine the aff under neg T or theory **A.** competing mutually exclusive interps make it possible for the neg to always read theory destroying substance education since the aff enters blind, don’t punish me for being forced to choose **B.** T interps are just paradigms for how we debate so winning one isn’t a reason to exclude my offense if it still is applicable **C.** time skew makes it so that it impossible to win theory and substance in the 1AR. Re-evaluating my offense under their interp solves by bringing the round to one layer. Also means drop the neg on my theory since I can’t beat back an abusive NC strat if I need to win theory and substance too.

If the neg reads theory or T and also a pre-fiat criticism of the affirmative that links to a role of the ballot, then they must specify which layer comes first in the NC. They’d violate if they didn’t pick K or theory as coming first in the NC. Otherwise I have no way to form a coherent 1AR since no matter how I allocate my time, you’ll be able to collapse to whatever I’ve undercovered and weigh that first. Impacts to fairness since without a strategy I can’t access the ballot and clash since 2NR will go for whatever I cover less and we don’t engage either layer in depth. Turns the K since we can’t get the discourse your role of the ballot requires.

# Extensions

## Intent Extension

Extend the analytic under Korsgaard, that all NC offense must be conceptualized through intent, which is true because of the unity of action, which they conceded. No new responses- the impact was very clear that all offense must be filtered through intents. That means I meet theory interps since it wasn’t my intent to violate them in the first place nor was it my intent to create abuse- violations contingent on what I did in round are thus irrelevant, and so all abuse was self-imposed. Also means no link on the K- that’s dependent on empirical circumstances not intents of action. Even so, preempts:

1. Fiat concerns the passage the plan, not whether framework is true on any given layer, so takes out pre-post fiat distinction arguments.
2. Theory/T concerns what you are due, but what you are due is only viewed through intention of action, means that intent frames their shell.

## Truth Testing

Extend that to negate means to deny the truth of, and the c point underneath, that when you sign the ballot for the better debater, the only coherent paradigm is truth testing. And that means that the only paradigm in the judge’s jurisdiction is truth testing. Your practical disadvantages with truth testing aren’t competitive with my argument, so there’s no impact to them. That means it’s the only one that’s possible for them to use regardless of however it’s bad, and even if they use another one, my argument is that judges should stick to what is within their jurisdiction.

### ROB Weighing

My role of the ballot is truth testing, which outweighs alternate ROBs:

1. Jurisdiction: your rob presumes the jurisdictional ability to evaluate it in the first place, but the best way to fulfill that ability is through judge’s truth testing, which is the only rob that textually meets the res, means the ultimate conclusion of your ROB being true is still that you use truth testing.
2. All statements posit that something is true or false, conceding to the ultimate importance of truth and falsity, means that all ROBs collapse to mine.
3. Ground: I include the most arguments – literally nothing is excluded, whereas yours arbitrarily permits and excludes certain arguments we make.

### Theory Weighing

Outweighs theory:

1. Theory doesn’t prove the truth or falsity of the res, but rather whether an action was abusive, or whether my actions might have affected the ability to determine the truth of my arguments, but those things aren’t relevant in proving the resolution’s truth.
2. ROB determines the ultimate obligation of the judge and why we’re debating, so we don’t even care about theory’s function unless we have the rob to contextualize theory.

# Add-Ons

## Ideal Theory

Additionally, my framework is the best way of resolving oppression: A. Bracketing discussions of ideal theory is key and solves disads – we can obviously say an ideal state ought to do a thing but recognize that real-world injustices demand a different approach. Only separating discussions of ideal and nonideal theory can allow us to understand the distinction B. We need fixed principles to have any meaningful application. Just as you cannot measure something with a ruler constantly changing length, you need a standard by which to judge real world events. Otherwise your framework is incoherent because it cannot measure moral progress at all

**Progress:** We need fixed principles. Just as you cannot measure something with a ruler constantly changing length, you need a standard by which to judge events. Without an ideal theory your framework or role of the ballot is incoherent and can never meet any goal or measure moral progress.

**Abstraction** is key to stopping oppression. **Wood**[[10]](#footnote-10)**:**

There is no plausibility at all, for example, in the suggestion that such Kantian **principles as** human **equality**, rationalism, **universalism**, and cosmopolitanism **are [not]** in their content **favorable to** racism, sexism, or other forms of **oppression**, and such a thesis needs only to be stated explicitly to discredit itself. But this highly implausible thesis may be put forward by implication if it can be associated with the quite distinct but correct point that *even* a cosmopolitan and universalistic ethical theory, such as Kant’s, can be combined with racist or male-supremacist views in its application. It is also true that **[these principles]** egalitarianism, rationalism, universalism, and cosmopolitanism **are** especially **liable to rhetorical** **abuse** by those who advocate policies in direct violation of them, because subscribing to the correct principles at an abstract level is often enough a shabby ploy used to protect contrary policies from criticism. **The thought that this** point **has any** *philosophical***significance**, however, **rests on an error** of abysmal proportions **about philosophy** and its relation to human practices. If someone thinks there is **a** philosophical **theory** of morality whose uncritical adoption and mechanical application would suffice **to protect us from evil,** then that person is looking for something that **could never exist.** The correct standard for an ethical theory is whether it gets things right at the level of basic principles and values, not whether it contains some magical property that protects us, in the application of the theory, from every perversion or abuse through the influence of tradition and prejudice or the infinite human ingenuity of rationalization. **All theories are** about equally **subject to** such **abuse**, and no theory is immune to it. In fact, if we **[To] think** that the adoption of **a certain philosoph[y]**ical theory, or a certain set of religious dogmas, **will protect us from all** **moral error**, that way of thinking itself **is** extremely dangerous, quite irrespective of the content of the theory or dogma with which we associate it. That thought itself is actually **responsible for** a lot of **the evil** that **people do.**

Any theory can be misused – but that isn’t a problem with theorizing, that is a problem with us. We should reclaim the true function of these concepts in places like debate to challenge the way they are misunderstood. Your argument is only uniqueness for the educational value of mine.

**Real world action:** It’s unclear whether minimizing oppression is better, or acting in a more deontological way. If I oppressed one person, which prevented the oppression of two, would it be ok? Only debating philosophical justification can ensure any value to anti-oppressive efforts. Oppression’s bad but the project of ethics is not to state the obvious – science doesn’t do that either. We know an apple falls but want to know more how the force of gravity interacts with the rest of the universe. In the same way, we know oppression is bad but interrogating the normative reasoning behind those claims will allow debaters to deal with more complicated problems in the real world.

Some conversations about ideal theory are good. Broad principles change peoples minds in inclusive ways and allow previously-excluded groups to claim political agency. **Holmstrom concurs with Mills[[11]](#footnote-11)**

We have to speak to people where they are, he says, and that means appealing to core values of liberalism: individualism, equal rights and moral egalitarianism. Against what he calls the conventional wisdom among radi- cals, he argues that there is no inherent incompatibility between these values and a radical agenda. If these values are suitably interpreted, I think he is absolutely right. Over two hundred years ago, Mary Wollstonecraft and Toussaint Louverture took the abstract universalistic principles of the French Revolution and extended them to groups they were intended to exclude. Gradually and incompletely women and blacks and landless men have achieved the democratic rights promised to all (in words) by the anti-feudal revolution. So I agree with Charles that such universalistic principles have great value; even if usually applied in self-serving ways, they have a deeply radical potential and it would be foolish of radicals to reject them, any more than we should reject all of the technological developments of the Indus- trial Revolution which also developed with the rise of capitalism. in fact, few American radicals have rejected these aspects of liberalism in their politi- cal practice but have been their strongest champions since the Revolution; socialists of all kinds helped to build the labor and civil rights movements.‘

**Social Change:** Philosophy debates are prerequisites to social change, **Goldstein ’14:**

Rebecca Newberger Goldstein (Former professor of Philosophy at Rutgers and Columbia, PhD from Princeton). “Why Study Philosophy? 'To Challenge Your Own Point of View'.” 27 February 2014.

http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/02/why-study-philosophy-to-challenge-your-own-point-of-view/283954/t

It’s amazing how long it takes us, but we do make progress. And **it’s usually philosophical arguments that first introduce the** very outlandish idea that we **need to extend rights.** And it takes more, it takes a movement, and **activism**, and emotions, to affect real social change. It **starts with an argument**, but then it becomes obvious. The tracks of philosophy’s work are erased because it becomes intuitively obvious. **The arguments against slavery,** against **cruel** and unusual **punishment,** against **unjust wars,** aginst treating children cruelly—**these** all **took** arguments. Which **philosophical arguments** have you seen shifting our national conversation, changing what we once thought was obvious? About **30 years ago, the philosopher Peter Singer started to argue about** the way animals are treated in our **factory farms.** Everybody thought he was nuts. But **I’ve watched this movement grow**; I’ve watched it become emotional. It has to become emotional. You have to draw empathy into it. But here it is, right in our time—a philosopher making the argument, everyone dismissing it, but then people start discussing it. Even criticizing it, or saying it’s not valid, is taking it seriously. This is what we have to teach our children. Even things that go against their intuition they need to take seriously. **What was intuition two generations ago is no longer** an intuition; **and it’s arguments that change it.** We are very inertial creatures. We do not like to change our thinking, especially if it’s inconvenient for us. And certainly the people in power never want to wonder whether they should hold power. So it really takes hard, hard work to overcome that.

**Extinction:** Philosophy debate solves extinction since it’s key to developing positive artificial intelligence which will guide the future of civilization; the brink is now. **Muehlhauser ‘11**[[12]](#footnote-12)

Barring a major collapse of human civilization (due to nuclear war, asteroid impact, etc.), many experts expect the [Artificial] intelligence explosion Singularity to occur within 50-200 years. That fact means that many philosophical problems, about which philosophers have argued for millennia, are suddenly very urgent. Those concerned with the fate of the galaxy must say to the philosophers: "Too slow! Stop screwing around with transcendental ethics and qualitative epistemologies! Start thinking with the precision of an AI researcher and solve these **problems!"** If a[n] **near-future** AI will determine the fate of the galaxy, we need to figure out what values we ought to give it. Should it ensure animal welfare? Is growing the human population a good thing? But those are questions of **applied ethics**. More fundamental are the questions about which normative ethics to give the AI: How would the AI decide if animal welfare or large human populations were good? What rulebook should it use to answer novel moral questions that arise in the future? But even more fundamental are the questions of meta-ethics. What do moral terms mean? Do moral facts exist? What justifies one normative rulebook over the other? The answers to these meta-ethical questions will determine the answers to the questions of normative ethics, which, if we are successful in planning the intelligence explosion, will determine the fate of the galaxy. Eliezer **Yudkowsky has put forward one meta-ethical theory, which informs** his plan for Friendly **AI**: Coherent Extrapolated Volition. **But what if that** meta-ethical theory **is wrong? The galaxy is at stake.** Princeton philosopher Richard Chappell worries about how Eliezer's meta-ethical theory depends on rigid designation, which in this context may amount to something like a semantic "trick." Previously and independently, an Oxford philosopher expressed the same worry to me in private. Eliezer's theory also employs something like the method of reflective equilibrium, about which there are many grave concerns from Eliezer's fellow naturalists, including Richard Brandt, Richard Hare, Robert Cummins, Stephen Stich, and others. My point is not to beat up on Eliezer's meta-ethical views. I don't even know if they're wrong. Eliezer is wickedly smart. He is highly trained in the skills of overcoming biases and properly proportioning beliefs to the evidence. He thinks with the precision of an AI researcher. In my opinion, that gives him large advantages over most philosophers. When Eliezer states and defends a particular view, I take that as significant Bayesian evidence for reforming my beliefs. Rather, my point is that we need lots of smart people working on these meta-ethical questions. We need to solve these problems, and quickly**.** The universe will not wait for the pace of traditional philosophy to catch up.

Implications – **A.** The fate of all our civilization – extinction precludes any value to the neg’s arguments since if we’re dead it doesn’t matter **B.** solves everything – AI, with the advent of the advanced computing techniques, could potentially end all suffering, **Ostroff ‘15:**

http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/06/26/artificial-intelligence-ai-richard-terrile-nasa\_n\_7654630.html

But **NASA scientist Richard Terrile**, who was coincidentally a technical adviser on "Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines" and spends his days trying to develop artificial intelligence, **thinks** that **AI could eventually fix everything from** ending **world hunger to** curing **cancer.** "I believe it can," he says. "These very, very advanced information systems, which go way beyond the capabilities of a human, I think are the way to go in actually solving these [problems]." Terrile has become famous for sounding like [Morpheus](http://www.mtvhive.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Morpheus-Red-or-Blue-Pill-the-matrix-1957140-500-568.jpg) with his theory that our universe could actually be a simulation. But he may eventually become much more famous for his AI day job. His "Matrix"-y mind-bender brought Terrile to speak at [Toronto's Ideacity conference](http://www.ideacityonline.com/speaker/richard-terrile/)last week but when he's not making college kids say "[woah](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WFNEgdwjEhs)," he's the director of the Center for Evolutionary Computation and Automated Design at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory in southern California. There, **he applies biological evolution** techniques **to computer algorithms** in hopes of **solving complex problems** such as creating artificial consciousness in machines. "We use the mathematics of evolution to see if we can evolve complexity," he explains. An architect can design a house, for example, but the end result's quality depends entirely on the abilities of that one architect. But Terrile can use the same theoretical building materials as "parents" and then run the data through a series of evolutionary "generations" to create something even better. **Evolutionary computation** is a relatively new field, dating back only about 20 years and complex enough at that time to require supercomputers. Now it can be done on laptops, and its use **has increased exponentially.** Essentially there are two primary means of teaching machines to think – give them as much data as possible to make decisions based on that information or, with evolutionary computation, you set up an information system, randomly vary it and test it over and over until achieving a Darwinian result. "It's that survival of the fittest testing which allows you to grow complexity," Terrile says. "How do you reverse-engineer a human brain? How do you understand neural networks? How do you develop a system which is artificially intelligent or self-aware? "I think this is going to be the way in which we do wake up our machines." That last bit is somewhat disconcerting for those of us who are sci-fi fans and know where this technological achievement always ends up. Terrile can't actually reassure us that Judgement Day (or the Age of Ultron, for Marvel fans) won't come to pass. "It may not be an unfair characterization, we don't know. How can we determine what something way more intelligent than us is going to do? Will it feel threatened by us? Would you feel threatened by us if someone could pull the plug on you? Probably. "Nevertheless, it's an inevitability. It’s like the tides. I don't think you'd be able to stop it. There's so much of an increase in computer capability that we already have systems that are comparable to the human brain. We've already crossed that threshold. It's just a matter of who's going to figure out the right wiring." He says that the real question is, "is there something we need to do about it? I kind of laugh when people say we need to introduce morality into these machines. Whose morality? The morality of today? The morality of tomorrow? The morality of the 15th century? We change our morality like we change our clothing." I ask if he feels like J. Robert Oppenheimer, the nuclear scientist who famously quoted the Bhagavad Gita after the first atomic bomb detonated: "Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds." "It's inevitable," he repeats, "and I'd rather be working on it than have some other, more nefarious, evil corporation or evil entity work on it. We're trying to do this in a realistic and credible safe way. But I don't think we're going to have those answers until it happens." But his bet is that artificial intelligence will help, not hurt, humanity. "The benefits of **AI** are that it **could solve all the world's problems.** All of them. Seriously. Technology could probably solve all of them in one form or another."

## Policy Good

### General

Policy education and practices like fiat are key to social change: state institutions aren’t ignorable, and simply pointing out problems isn’t enough. **Themba-Nixon 2k**[[13]](#footnote-13)

Getting It in Writing Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation [and]. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

Alternate roles militarize the debate-space. Every single thing we do in and out of round becomes subject to criticism. That destroys debate as a protected space for critical thinking. **Coverstone 95** writes[[14]](#footnote-14)

Yet, Mitchell goes too far. In two important areas, his argument is slightly miscalibrated. First, Mitchell underestimates the value of debate as it is currently practiced. **There is great**er **value in the** somewhat **insular nature of our** present **activity** than he assumes. **Debate's inward focus creates an unusual space for training and practice with the tools of modem political discourse. Such space is largely unavailable elsewhere in American society.** Second, Mitchell overextends his concept of **activism**. He argues fervently for mass action along ideological lines. Such a turn **replaces control by society's information elite with control by an elite all our own.** More than any other group in America today, practitioners of debate should recognize the subtle issues upon which political diversity turns. Mitchell's search for broad themes around which to organize mass action runs counter to this insight. As a result, Mitchell's call for **an outward activist turn threatens to subvert the very values it seeks to achieve**

### Race

Racial progress has occurred though legal change --- pessimism ignores specific reforms that achieved lasting reductions in racial inequality

-- desegregation of the armed forces, the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act, repeal of anti-miscegenation laws

-- spills over to legal access for feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements

-- antiblackness is political, not ontological; incarceration is used as a tool to suppress voting rights, women of color are policed via reproductive rights laws

**Omi and Winant 13**

Michael Omi (Sociologist at UC Berkeley, focusing on antiracism scholarship and Asian American studies) and Howard Winant (Professor of Sociology affiliated with the Black Studies and Chicana/o Studies departments of UC Santa Barbara), Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias, Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 36, Issue 6, p. 961-973, Special Issue: Symposium - Rethinking Racial Formation Theory. 2013.

In Feagin and Elias's account, white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable and permanent. There is little sense that the ‘white racial frame’ evoked by systemic racism theory changes in significant ways over historical time. They dismiss important rearrangements and reforms as merely ‘a distraction from more ingrained structural oppressions and deep lying inequalities that continue to define US society’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21). Feagin and Elias use a concept they call ‘surface flexibility’ to argue that white elites frame racial realities in ways that suggest change, but are merely engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial oppression. Feagin and Elias say the phrase ‘racial democracy’ is an oxymoron – a word defined in the dictionary as a figure of speech that combines contradictory terms. If they mean the USA is a contradictory and incomplete democracy in respect to race and racism issues, we agree. If they mean that people of colour have no democratic rights or political power in the USA, we disagree. The USA is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view it is also in many respects a racial democracy, capable of being influenced towards more or less inclusive and redistributive economic policies, social policies, or for that matter, imperial policies. What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (post-Second World War to the present) with respect to race and racism? Over the past decades there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to contain and neutralize civil rights, to restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different institutional sites – employment, health, education – persist and in many cases have increased. Indeed, the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage crisis, for example, was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened tremendously. It would be easy to conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white racial dominance has been continuous and unchanging throughout US history. But such a perspective misses the dramatic twists and turns in racial politics that have occurred since the Second World War and the civil rights era. Feagin and Elias claim that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights movement, and that we ‘overlook the serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge racial inequalities’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. We do not. In Racial Formation we wrote about ‘racial reaction’ in a chapter of that name, and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little attention to our arguments there; perhaps because they are in substantial agreement with us. While we argue that the right wing was able to ‘rearticulate’ race and racism issues to roll back some of the gains of the civil rights movement, we also believe that there are limits to what the right could achieve in the post-civil rights political landscape. So we agree that the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole story. US racial conditions have changed over the post-Second World War period, in ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of the major reforms of the 1960s have proved irreversible; they have set powerful democratic forces in motion. These racial (trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the black movement, but not confined to blacks alone. Consider the desegregation of the armed forces, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like Loving v. Virginia that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his ‘interest convergence hypothesis’ effectively explains all these developments. How does Lyndon Johnson's famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 – ‘We have lost the South for a generation’ – count as ‘convergence’? The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways. As Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorporation of opposition (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime – under movement pressure – was exercising its hegemony. But Gramsci insists that such reforms – which he calls ‘passive revolutions’ – cannot be merely symbolic if they are to be effective: oppositions must win real gains in the process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics, not absolute rule. So yes, we think there were important if partial victories that shifted the racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life. And yes, we think that further victories can take place both on the broad terrain of the state and on the more immediate level of social interaction: in daily interaction, in the human psyche and across civil society. Indeed we have argued that in many ways **the most important accomplishment** of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of the social. In the USA and indeed around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined ‘others’ and the democratization of structurally racist societies, but also the recognition and **validation by both the state and civil society** of racially-defined experience and identity. These demands broadened and deepened democracy itself. They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black movement and its allies, but also the political advances towards equality, social justice and inclusion accomplished by other ‘new social movements’: second-wave **feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements** among others. By no means do we think that the post-war movement upsurge was an unmitigated success. Far from it: all the new social movements were subject to the same ‘rearticulation’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that produced the racial ideology of ‘colourblindness’ and its variants; indeed all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose from the political right to counter them. Yet even their incorporation and containment, even their confrontations with the various ‘backlash’ phenomena of the past few decades, even the need to develop the highly contradictory ideology of ‘colourblindness’, reveal the transformative character of the ‘politicization of the social’. While it is not possible here to explore so extensive a subject, it is worth noting that it was the long-delayed eruption of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the mainstream political arena that set off this transformation, shaping both the democratic and anti-democratic social movements that are evident in US politics today. What are the political implications of contemporary racial trends? Feagin and Elias's use of racial categories can be imprecise. This is not their problem alone; anyone writing about race and racism needs to frame terms with care and precision, and we undoubtedly get fuzzy too from time to time. The absence of a careful approach leads to ‘racial lumping’ and essentialisms of various kinds. This imprecision is heightened in polemic. In the Feagin and Elias essay the term ‘whites’ at times refers to all whites, white elites, ‘dominant white actors’ and very exceptionally, anti-racist whites, a category in which we presume they would place themselves. Although the terms ‘black’, ‘African American’ and ‘Latino’ appear, the term ‘people of colour’ is emphasized, often in direct substitution for black reference points. In the USA today it is important not to frame race in a bipolar manner. The black/white paradigm made more sense in the past than it does in the twenty-first century. The racial make-up of the nation has now changed dramatically. Since the passage of the Immigration Reform Act of 1965, the USA has become more ‘coloured’. A ‘majority–minority’ national demographic shift is well underway. Predicted to arrive by the mid-twenty-first century, the numerical eclipse of the white population is already in evidence locally and regionally. In California, for example, non-Hispanic whites constitute only 39.7 per cent of the state's population. While the decline in the white population cannot be correlated with any decline of white racial dominance, the dawning and deepening of racial multipolarity calls into question a sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit black/white racial framework that is evident in Feagin and Elias's essay. Shifting racial demographics and identities also raise general questions of race and racism in new ways that the ‘systemic racism’ approach is not prepared to explain.3 Class questions and issues of panethnicizing trends, for example, call into question what we mean by race, racial identity and race consciousness. No racially defined group is even remotely uniform; groups that we so glibly refer to as Asian American or Latino are particularly heterogeneous. Some have achieved or exceeded socio-economic parity with whites, while others are subject to what we might call ‘engineered poverty’ in sweatshops, dirty and dangerous labour settings, or prisons. Tensions within panethnicized racial groups are notably present, and conflicts between racially defined groups (‘black/brown’ conflict, for example) are evident in both urban and rural settings. A substantial current of social scientific analysis now argues that Asians and Latinos are the ‘new white ethnics’, able to ‘work toward whiteness’4 at least in part, and that the black/white bipolarity retains its distinct and foundational qualities as the mainstay of US racism (Alba and Nee 2005; Perlmann 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Waters, Ueda and Marrow 2007). We question that argument in light of the massive demographic shifts taking place in the USA. Globalization, climate change and above all neoliberalism on a global scale, all drive migration. The country's economic capacity to absorb enormous numbers of immigrants, low-wage workers and their families (including a new, globally based and very female, servant class) without generating the sort of established subaltern groups we associate with the terms race and racism, may be more limited than it was when the ‘whitening’ of Europeans took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In other words this argument's key precedent, the absorption of white immigrants ‘of a different color’ (Jacobson 1998), may no longer apply. Indeed, we might think of the assimilationist model itself as a general theory of immigrant incorporation that was based on a historically specific case study – one that might not hold for, or be replicated by, subsequent big waves of immigration. Feagin and Elias's systemic racism model, while offering numerous important insights, does not inform concrete analysis of these issues. It is important going forward to understand how groups are differentially racialized and relatively positioned in the US racial hierarchy: once again racism must be seen as a shifting racial project. This has important consequences, not only with respect to emerging patterns of inequality, but also in regard to the degree of power available to different racial actors to define, shape or contest the existing racial landscape. Attention to such matters is largely absent in Feagin and Elias's account. In their view racially identified groups are located in strict reference to the dominant ‘white racial frame’, hammered into place, so to speak. As a consequence, they fail to examine how racially subordinate groups interact and influence each others’ boundaries, conditions and practices. Because they offer so little specific analysis of Asian American, Latino or Native American racial issues, the reader finds her/himself once again in the land (real or imaginary, depending on your racial politics) of bipolar US racial dynamics, in which whites and blacks play the leading roles, and other racially identified groups – as well as those ambiguously identified, such as Middle Eastern and South Asian Americans (MEASA) – play at best supporting roles, and are sometimes cast as extras or left out of the picture entirely. We still want to acknowledge that blacks have been catching hell and have borne the brunt of the racist reaction of the past several decades. For example, we agree with Feagin and Elias's critique of the reactionary politics of incarceration in the USA. The ‘new Jim Crow’ (Alexander 2012) or even the ‘new slavery’ that the present system practises is something that was just in its beginning stages when we were writing Racial Formation. It is now recognized as a national and indeed global scandal. How is it to be understood? Of course there are substantial debates on this topic, notably about the nature of the ‘prison-industrial complex’ (Davis 2003, p. 3) and the social and cultural effects of mass incarceration along racial lines. But beyond Feagin and Elias's denunciation of the ferocious white racism that is operating here, deeper political implications are worth considering. As Alexander (2012), Mauer (2006), Manza and Uggen (2008) and movement groups like Critical Resistance and the Ella Baker Center argue, the upsurge over recent decades in incarceration rates for black (and brown) men expresses the fear-based, law-and-order appeals that have shaped US racial politics since the rise of Nixonland (Perlstein 2008) and the ‘Southern strategy’. Perhaps even more central, racial repression aims at restricting the increasing impact of voters of colour in a demographically shifting electorate. There is a lot more to say about this, but for the present two key points stand out: first, it is not an area where Feagin and Elias and we have any sharp disagreement, and second, for all the horrors and injustices that the ‘new Jim Crow’ represents, incarceration, profiling and similar practices remain political issues. These practices and policies are not ineluctable and unalterable dimensions of the US racial regime. There have been previous waves of reform in these areas. They can be transformed again by mass mobilization, electoral shifts and so on. In other words, resistance is not futile. Speaking of electoral shifts and the formal political arena, how should President Barack Obama be politically situated in this discussion? How do Feagin and Elias explain Obama? Quite amazingly, his name does not appear in their essay. Is he a mere token, an ‘oreo’, a shill for Wall Street? Or does Obama represent a new development in US politics, a black leader of a mass, multiracial party that for sheer demographic reasons alone might eventually triumph over the white people's party, the Republicans? If the President is neither the white man's token nor Neo, the One,5 then once again we are in the world of politics: neither the near-total white despotism depicted by Feagin and Elias, nor a racially inclusive democracy. President Obama continues to enjoy widespread black support, although it is clear that he has not protected blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of wealth in history. He has not explicitly criticized the glaring racial bias in the US carceral system. He has not intervened in conflicts over workers’ rights – particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of colour are concentrated. He has not intervened to halt or slow foreclosures, except in ways that were largely symbolic. Workers and lower-middle-class people were the hardest hit by the great recession and the subprime home mortgage crisis, with black families faring worst, and Latinos close behind (Rugh and Massey 2010); Obama has not defended them. Many writers have explained Obama's centrism and unwillingness to raise the issue of race as functions of white racism (Sugrue 2010). The black community – and other communities of colour as well – remains politically divided. While black folk have taken the hardest blows from the reactionary and racist regime that has mostly dominated US politics since Reagan (if not since Nixon), no united black movement has succeeded the deaths of Malcolm and Martin. Although there is always important political activity underway, a relatively large and fairly conservative black middle class, a ‘black bourgeoisie’ in Frazier's (1957) terms, has generally maintained its position since the end of the civil rights era. Largely based in the public sector, and including a generally centrist business class as well, this stratum has continued to play the role that Frazier – and before him, Charles S. Johnson. William Lloyd Warner, Alison Davis and other scholars – identified: vacillation between the white elite and the black masses. Roughly similar patterns operate in Latino communities as well, where the ‘working towards whiteness’ framework coexists with a substantial amount of exclusion and super-exploitation. Alongside class issues in communities of colour, there are significant gender issues. The disappearance of blue-collar work, combined with the assault by the criminal justice system – chiefly profiling by the police (‘stop and frisk’) and imprisonment, have both unduly targeted and victimized black and brown men, especially youth. Women of colour are also targeted, especially by violence, discrimination and assaults on their reproductive rights (Harris-Perry 2011); profiling is everywhere (Glover 2009). Here again we are in the realm of racial politics. Debate proceeds in the black community on Obama's credibilty, with Cornel West and Tavis Smiley leading the critics. But it seems safe to say that in North Philly, Inglewood or Atlanta's Lakewood section, the president remains highly popular. Latino support for Obama remains high as well. Feagin and Elias need to clarify their views on black and brown political judgement. Is it attuned to political realities or has it been captured by the white racial frame? Is Obama's election of no importance? \*\*\* In conclusion, do Feagin and Elias really believe that white power is so complete, so extensive, so ‘sutured’ (as Laclau and Mouffe might say) as they suggest here? Do they mean to suggest, in Borg-fashion, that ‘resistance is futile?’ This seems to be the underlying political logic of the ‘systemic racism’ approach, perhaps unintentionally so. Is white racism so ubiquitous that no meaningful political challenge can be mounted against it? Are black and brown folk (yellow and red people, and also others unclassifiable under the always- absurd colour categories) utterly supine, duped, abject, unable to exert any political pressure? Is such a view of race and racism even recognizable in the USA of 2012? And is that a responsible political position to be advocating? Is this what we want to teach our students of colour? Or our white students for that matter? We suspect that if pressed, Feagin and Elias would concur with our judgement that racial conflict, both within (and against) the state and in everyday life, is a fundamentally political process. We think that they would also accept our claim that the ongoing political realities of race provide extensive evidence that people of colour in the USA are not so powerless, and that whites are not so omnipotent, as Feagin and Elias's analysis suggests them to be. Racial formation theory allows us to see that there are contradictions in racial oppression. The racial formation approach reveals that white racism is unstable and constantly challenged, from the national and indeed global level down to the personal and intra-psychic conflicts that we all experience, no matter what our racial identity might be. While racism – largely white – continues to flourish, it is not monolithic. Yes, there have been enormous increases in racial inequality in recent years. But movement-based anti-racist opposition continues, and sometimes scores victories. Challenges to white racism continue both within the state and in civil society. Although largely and properly led by people of colour, anti-racist movements also incorporate whites such as Feagin and Elias themselves. Movements may experience setbacks, the reforms for which they fought may be revealed as inadequate, and indeed their leaders may be co-opted or even eliminated, but racial subjectivity and self-awareness, unresolved and conflictual both within the individual psyche and the body politic, abides. Resistance is not futile.

Anti-blackness isn’t ontological – policy’s the best venue to combat it

**Bouie 13**, staff writer at The American Prospect, Making and Dismantling Racism, http://prospect.org/article/making-and-dismantling-racism

Over at The Atlantic, Ta-Nehisi Coates has been exploring the intersection of race and public policy, with a focus on white supremacy as a driving force in political decisions at all levels of government. This has led him to two conclusions: First, that anti-black racism as we understand it is a creation of explicit policy choices—the decision to exclude, marginalize, and stigmatize Africans and their descendants has as much to do with racial prejudice as does any intrinsic tribalism. And second, that it's possible to dismantle this prejudice using public policy. Here is Coates in his own words: Last night I had the luxury of sitting and talking with the brilliant historian Barbara Fields. One point she makes that very few Americans understand is that racism is a creation. You read Edmund Morgan’s work and actually see racism being inscribed in the law and the country changing as a result. If we accept that racism is a creation, then we must then accept that it can be destroyed. And if we accept that it can be destroyed, we must then accept that it can be destroyed by us and that it likely must be destroyed by methods kin to creation. **Racism was created by policy. It will** likely **only be** ultimately **destroyed by policy.** Over at his blog, Andrew Sullivan offers a reply: I don’t believe the law created racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred. It can encourage or mitigate these profound aspects of human psychology – it can create racist structures as in the Jim Crow South or Greater Israel. But it can no more end these things that it can create them. A complementary strategy is finding ways for the targets of such hatred to become inured to them, to let the slurs sting less until they sting not at all. Not easy. But a more manageable goal than TNC’s utopianism. I can appreciate the point Sullivan is making, but I'm not sure it's relevant to Coates' argument. It is absolutely true that "Group loyalty is deep in our DNA," as Sullivan writes. And if you define racism as an overly aggressive form of group loyalty—basically just prejudice—then Sullivan is right to throw water on the idea that the law can "create racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred." But Coates is making a more precise claim: That **there's nothing natural about the black/white divide** that has defined American history. White Europeans had contact with black Africans well before the trans-Atlantic slave trade **without** the emergence of an **anti-black racism**. It took **particular choices** made by particular people—in this case, plantation owners in colonial Virginia—to make black skin a stigma, to make the "one drop rule" a defining feature of American life for more than a hundred years. By enslaving African indentured servants and allowing their white counterparts a chance for upward mobility, colonial landowners began the process that would make white supremacy the ideology of America. The position of slavery generated a stigma that then justified continued enslavement—blacks are lowly, therefore we must keep them as slaves. Slavery (and later, Jim Crow) wasn't built to reflect racism as much as it was built in tandem with it. And later policy, in the late 19th and 20th centuries, further entrenched white supremacist attitudes. Block black people from owning homes, and they're forced to reside in crowded slums. Onlookers then use the reality of slums to deny homeownership to blacks, under the view that they're unfit for suburbs. In other words, create a prohibition preventing a marginalized group from engaging in socially sanctioned behavior—owning a home, getting married—and then blame them for the adverse consequences. Indeed, in arguing for gay marriage and responding to conservative critics, Sullivan has taken note of this exact dynamic. Here he is twelve years ago, in a column for The New Republic that builds on earlier ideas: Gay men--not because they're gay but because they are men in an all-male subculture--are almost certainly more sexually active with more partners than most straight men. (Straight men would be far more promiscuous, I think, if they could get away with it the way gay guys can.) Many gay men value this sexual freedom more than the stresses and strains of monogamous marriage (and I don't blame them). But this is not true of all gay men. Many actually yearn for social stability, for anchors for their relationships, for the family support and financial security that come with marriage. To deny this is surely to engage in the "soft bigotry of low expectations." They may be a minority at the moment. But with legal marriage, their numbers would surely grow. And they would function as emblems in gay culture of a sexual life linked to stability and love. [Emphasis added] What else is this but a variation on Coates' core argument, that society can create stigmas by using law to force particular kinds of behavior? Insofar as gay men were viewed as unusually promiscuous, it almost certainly had something to do with the fact that society refused to recognize their humanity and sanction their relationships. The absence of any institution to mediate love and desire encouraged behavior that led this same culture to say "these people are too degenerate to participate in this institution." If the prohibition against gay marriage helped create an anti-gay stigma, then lifting it—as we've seen over the last decade—has helped destroy it. There's no reason racism can't work the same way.

# Theory Frontlines

## CX Extension (Spec, Nebel T)

Extend the analytic under the plan text, that I’m willing to further specify or *remove specification* so long as I’m not forced to abandon my maxim. That means all abuse from their shell was self-imposed – I would’ve been willing to defend the res as a general principle. They’ve also conceded that I automatically meet all interps they fail to check, so vote aff because of proportionality: the neg asserts drop the debater if comfortable with the round devolving into theory, so I ensure proportional punishment since reject the arg dodges an RVI. Proves uniqueness- neg has access to bidirectional interps which I’ll always violate since I have set grounds, which outweighs:

A. No chilling effect – debaters would still lose to a true interp and people who read frivolous theory won’t be deterred from their strong point- they’d just read better interps

B. Real world- the death penalty isn’t given for every minor offense. Punishment has to be proportional to the crime, else people are held accountable for things they didn’t do, which is the worst harm to fairness.

## AT Nebel T

Counterinterp: I can specify if a) I disclosed this advocacy before the tournament b) I disclosed that I’m willing to remove specifications beforehand for this plan c) I would’ve been willing to defend specific enforcement mechanisms in CX

1. Resolvability – if at the conclusion of the debate the aff is ahead that nuclear power is bad in one country and the neg is winning under another, there’s no way to know who wins unless the aff specced a country. Resolvability is an independent voter since every debate needs a winner – even if their abuse story is correct, none of their standards matter unless the judge can actually adjudicate who’s winning those arguments. Outweighs grammar – even if there’s a marginal issue with grammar, judges can obviously still adjudicate the round.

2. There are infinite types of nuclear power, be it materials used to produce it, the type of reactor, the purpose, and the energy the reactor produces. **WNA**:[[15]](#footnote-15)

The first commercial nuclear power stations started operation in the 1950s. There are about 440 commercial nuclear power reactors operable in 31 countries, with over 380,000 MWe of total capacity. About 65 more reactors are under construction. They provide over 11% of the world's electricity as continuous, reliable base-load power, without carbon dioxide emissions. 56 countries operate a total of about 240 research reactors and a further 180 nuclear reactors power some 140 ships and submarines.

Nuclear technology uses the energy [is] released by splitting the atoms of certain elements. It was first developed in the 1940s, and during the Second World War to 1945 research initially focussed on producing bombs by splitting the atoms of particular isotopes of either uranium or plutonium.In the 1950s attention turned to the peaceful purposes of nuclear fission, notably for power generation. Today, the world produces as much electricity from nuclear energy as it did from all sources combined in the early years of nuclear power. Civil nuclear power can now boast over 16,500 reactor years of experience and supplies almost 11.5% of global electricity needs, from reactors in 31 countries. In fact, through regional grids, many more than those countries depend on nuclear-generated power.Many countries have also built research reactors to provide a source of neutron beams for scientific research and the production of medical and industrial isotopes.Today, only eight countries are known to have a nuclear weapons capability. By contrast, 56 countries operate about 240 civil research reactors, over one third of these in developing countries. Now 31 countries host some 440 commercial nuclear power reactors with a total installed capacity of over 380,000 MWe (see linked table for up to date figures). This is more than three times the total generating capacity of France or Germany from all sources. About 65 further nuclear power reactors are under construction, equivalent to 18% of existing capacity, while over 150 are firmly planned, equivalent to nearly half of present capacity. Sixteen countries depend on nuclear power for at least a quarter of their electricity. France gets around three-quarters of its power from nuclear energy, while Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovenia and Ukraine get one-third or more. South Korea and Bulgaria normally get more than 30% of their power from nuclear energy, while in the USA, UK, Spain, Romania and Russia almost one-fifth is from nuclear. Japan is used to relying on nuclear power for more than one-quarter of its electricity and is expected to return to that level. Among countries which do not host nuclear power plants, Italy and Denmark get almost 10% of their power from nuclear.In electricity demand, the need for low-cost continuous, reliable supply can be distinguished from peak demand occurring over few hours daily and able to command higher prices. Supply needs to match demand instantly and reliably over time. There are number of characteristics of nuclear power which make it particularly valuable apart from its actual generation cost per unit – MWh or kWh. Fuel is a low proportion of power cost, giving power price stability, its fuel is on site (not depending on continuous delivery), it is dispatchable on demand, it has fairly quick ramp-up, it contributes to clean air and low-CO2 objectives, it gives good voltage support for grid stability. These attributes are mostly not monetised in merchant markets, but have great value which is increasingly recognised where dependence on intermittent sources has grown.

As nuclear power plant construction returns to the levels reached during the 1970s and 1980s, those plants now operating are producing more electricity. In 2011, production was 2518 billion kWh. The increase over the six years to 2006 (210 TWh) was equal to the output from 30 large new nuclear power plants. Yet between 2000 and 2006 there was no net increase in reactor numbers (and only 15 GWe in capacity). The rest of the improvement is due to better performance from existing units.In a longer perspective, from 1990 to 2010, world capacity rose by 57 GWe (17.75%, due both to net addition of new plants and uprating some established ones) and electricity production rose 755 billion kWh (40%). The relative contributions to this increase were: new construction 36%, uprating 7% and availability increase 57%. In 2011 and 2012 both capacity and output diminished due to cutbacks in Germany and Japan following the Fukushima accident.Considering 400 power reactors over 150 MWe for which data are available: over 1980 to 2000 world median capacity factor increased from 68% to 86%, and since then it has maintained around 85%. Actual load factors are slightly lower: 80% average in 2012 (excluding Japan), due to reactors being operated below their full capacity for various reasons. One quarter of the world's reactors have load factors of more than 90%, and nearly two thirds do better than 75%, compared with about a quarter of them over 75% in 1990. The USA now dominates the top 25 positions, followed by South Korea, but six other countries are also represented there. Four of the top ten reactors for lifetime load factors are South Korean.US nuclear power plant performance has shown a steady improvement over the past twenty years, and the average load factor in 2012 was 81%, up from 66% in 1990 and 56% in 1980. US capacity factors have been over 90% in five of the seven years to 2013. This places the USA as the performance leader with nearly half of the top 50 reactors, the 50th achieving more than 94% in 2012. The USA accounts for nearly one third of the world's nuclear electricity.In 2012, ten countries with four or more units averaged better than 80% load factor, while French reactors averaged 73.6%, despite many being run in load-following mode, rather than purely for base-load power.Some of these figures suggest near-maximum utilisation, given that most reactors have to shut down every 18-24 months for fuel change and routine maintenance. In the USA this used to take over 100 days on average but in the last decade it has averaged about 40 days. Another performance measure is unplanned capability loss, which in the USA has for the last few years been below 2%.

Impact is you kill clash - we don’t even know what we’re debating or what evidence we can use to apply to the debate, so we can’t even debate about nuclear power in the first place. Uniquely key on this topic – my ev indicates there are a variety of reactor type, reaction type, and energy production levels. Clash outweighs other standards because whether your interp is best for fairness or education is irrelevant if we can’t access that interp in-round.

### AT Grammar/Semantics

1. Assumes I need to even defend the res in the first place, but I take out that fundamental claim since I only need to defend the plan

2. “We should invite our friends over” doesn’t mean *all* of our friends, but exhibits the same form as the resolutional sentence. That’s clearly a grammatical sentence that expresses an intention that’s satisfied by inviting over SOME friends. At worst, we’re both grammatical.

3. Not a voter: A. “Generic bare plurals” is such an obscure issue that this is a super small link to “can’t understand the aff” impact B. No author writes about the actual topic wording, and the fact debaters don’t start their cases with the resolution anymore proves precise wording is irrelevant C. Debaters shouldn’t be held responsible for the NFL topic committee’s failure to write a topic consistent with the topic lit.

4. My counter interp proves straying slightly from the text is good. We should use the topic as a starting point to do more nuanced research. The only reason why your voter is important is for fairness and education since it proves if we viewed the res your way we’d get better, topical debates, which means I get to weigh my internal links.

Pragmatics outweigh:

1. Determines the actual debate – there’s no real harm from my not being slightly consistent semantically/grammatically, but the actual abuse in round from standards like ground or limits determines whether we can actually debate.
2. Strength of link – if I have link turns and impact defense, then view pragmatics on a higher layer if the semantics layer is cluttered.

### AT Ground

1. Turn: You kill tradeoff ground – harms are country-specific – the idea of stopping pollution or racism seems good and no one just says “we should just let everyone have nuclear reactors,” the problem is the specific tradeoffs each country has to make, like how it restricts freedom or could lead to backlash, which also means I outweigh your generic ground claims.

2. Turn: you kill solvency deficits – different violations of kant based on policy specific means you can’t challenge them without knowing where they’re implemented. Outweighs – offense is scientific so you need to be able to make link takeouts to them.

3. Turn: You explode pic ground. You can pic out of literally any country under your interp, which is unfair since it moots all AC offense. Outweighs - you can try to come up with something against a specific plan by applying generics, but there’s nothing I can do once you pic out of all my offense

### AT Limits

1. Turn: under your interp negs would have to research literally every single country and find out how nuclear power operates in every single possible country. Outweighs - means there’s endless research, whereas with my interp, we discuss just one aff.

2. You don’t solve – even if I defended whole res with a specific plan, it’d still be harder for you to answer my specific advantages, so it’d be easy to get rid of the generic answers you’d read

3. Wiki solves your impact – plan text has been disclosed for weeks so you had the chance to write a prepout

4. Solvency advocates solve – that I could find multiple authors who support this plan means you could too and could be expected to.

## AT Plan + Kant Bad

Counterinterp: I can if a) I have on my wiki that I’ll disclose all potential advocacies b) this advocacy text has been disclosed before the tournament c) all the offense is Kantian

1. No abuse: your argument is applicable to literally any framework, which means that any plan would be abusive, since they all require some sort of framework that the aff chose because of its strategic value.

2. Critical thinking: combination of policy education and ethics – the real world isn’t solely one. Also, policymaking and ethics are intertwined – ethics determines which policy actions we should take, and policy affects how we take ethical actions. That outweighs your education offense – I combine the best of both types of ed. Outweighs fairness: A. ultimate purpose B. fairness only matters relative to some goal C. existence of the activity

### O/V

No abuse you can read fw and cp too, that’s terminal defense to your interp since fairness concerns what I do you can’t, so if you can engage in the same practices, then all your offense goes away

### AT Strat Skew

1. No warrant why uniquely a Kant framework is bad – there isn’t a default assumption that a plan has to be utilitarian
2. Turn: you can make analytic turns why a prohibition on nuclear power in general violates a perfect or imperfect duty, or why it’s logically non-universalizable. Those are more accessible than turns that require you to do a lot of research specific to my plan text. Outweighs – your offense presumes the ability for you to make arguments in the first place, I say that my counterinterp is key to that

### AT Resolvability

1. Judges resolve it all the time
2. Ripstein writes political philosophy and kant – obviously about actions the government should take with Kant’s philosophy in mind, so it’s resolvable.
3. Germany is explicitly Kantian – proves states can take resolvable actions with kant and a plan.

# K Frontlines

## AT Kant K

Objections about the racism or sexism of reason miss the point and concede the validity of deontic theory. **Wood**:[[16]](#footnote-16)

The gender and color of “reason.” To be taken more seriously are those criticisms of reason which take the form of claiming that the traditional notion of reason, in both philosophy and culture, is gendered (masculine) or ethnically biased (in favor of imperialist Europeans). Just as for Darcy ‘reason’ refers to the deliverances of his class prejudices, so it can be true for a lot of our culture, and also for even its greatest philosophers, that **what is** taken to be **“rational” is** systematically **determined by social ideologies and traditions**, so that “rational nature” may take on for them the characteristics of their culture, or gender or class, and related notions like ‘universal law’ come to express some invidious particularism. In the previous section we have even seen some solid grounds for raising questions of this kind about Kant himself. The crucial point, however, is that notions like ‘**reason’ and ‘universal validity’ could not play this ideological role if they did not** *also, and* ***more fundamentally***, **refer to the** human **capacity that enables people** (often only gradually and painfully) **to criticize their false conceptions** (including their false conceptions of reason itself). For it is **only by appealing to** the critical capacity of **reason** (**which we** ourselves **presuppose even in criticizing the** “gendered” or **“colored” character** of “reason” in philosophy or in other areas of life) **that the ideologies are capable of mystifying**, deceiving, **and passing off one thing for another**.

The Kantian subject is the embodied subject—universalizability is essential to mutual recognition of others. **Farr**:[[17]](#footnote-17)

One of the most popular criticisms of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that although a distinction between the **universal and the concrete** is a valid distinction, the **unity** of the two **is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. Kant is often accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty, noumenal subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. **The Kantian subject is** an **embodied**, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that **we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. **The individual is not allowed to exclude others as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. Hence, the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

# Contention Frontlines

## AT Omnilateral Will

1. Cross apply Suprenant – he says that permitting the state to restrict speech would result in a logical contradictory maxim because the only reason why the omnilateral will exists in the first place is that it must ensure a unilateral will that listens to all, which only allowing free speech ensures. Outweighs your offense under the omnilateral will a) I account for the initial instantiation of the omnilateral will and why it was created in the first place b) even if subversive speech is possible, logical contradictions are the primary offense under the standard.

2. Empirically disproven – saying the state is oppressive reforms the state but doesn’t subvert its authority. E.g. the Civil Rights Movement criticized many state actions but didn’t result in the collapse of the state, just its reform.

3. Doesn’t even link – seditious speech, i.e. speech that incites violence that can overthrow the state, isn’t constitutionally protected, so the turn doesn’t even matter. **Ruane ’14** clarifies:[[18]](#footnote-18)

The “fighting words” doctrine began in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, where the Court held that fighting word, by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace and may be punished consistent with the First Amendment. In Chaplinsky, the Court upheld a statute which prohibited a person from addressing “any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place,” calling “him by any offensive or derisive name,” or making “any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with the intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or occupation.” The state court constructed the statute as forbidding only those expressions that “have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark [was] addressed.”

## AT Hate Speech

1. Cross apply Varden – hate speech isn’t a violation of the standard since words themselves don’t violate your ability to freely act. Sure, words might be bad, but there’s nothing inherent about them that inhibits your ability to act on a certain maxim

2. Cross apply ACLU – hate speech is ineffective since it inhibits productive discourse that’s necessary to change the campus culture. Simply restricting types of speech still enables those positions to be out there in the open.

# FW Frontlines

## AT Util

1. Consequences are foreseen and are thus not part of the original will that’s part of the unity of action, and so they’re irrelevant - extend that only the initial intent you take can satisfy the unity of action.
2. Extend the Furrow, the first reason to prefer practical reason – empirical realities like consequences cannot be the basis of morality because we’re not morally culpable for them. That means the NC framework fails since it can’t possibly establish any coherent account of morality. Only a priori practical reason can solve, which they’ve conceded.
3. Extend the second reason to prefer practical reason, that questioning practical reason in the first place concedes to its authority, means that the NC framework collapses to mine.
4. Not universalizable – you can’t universalize a maxim of lying even if it’ll help some people because then the concept of lying would be logically incoherent since the only reason we can tell that someone’s lying is that most people tell the truth. They’ve conceded Korsgaard 2, which says that a condition of a framework is that the agent’s action is universalizable.

## AT Descriptive Standards

1. Practical reason functions a priori, which means that descriptive standards are fundamentally incompatible with this premise, since I cannot be culpable for knowing certain empirical facts. That means you affirm on the framework.
2. Extend the second reason to prefer the framework, that questioning practical reason concedes to its truth, which means that you use the aff framework since the conclusion of practical reason is that you care about universalizability.

## AT Skep

1. Practical reason implies that we always internalize X action to be good, but doing nothing wouldn’t meet that requirement
2. Non universalizable to not care about atrocities – perfect duties outweigh, which means you vote aff on risk of offense
3. Extend the second reason to prefer practical reason, that takes out the entirety of the skep framework since they all question moral claims and whether practical reason is relevant, but questioning whether it’s relevant concedes that it’s correct.
4. Unity of action means your offense isn’t relevant since intent comes first

## AT Hobbes

1. My framework is the conclusion of the NC standard –
2. The Kantian sovereign can’t just do whatever it wants – it can only act in accordance with a system of equal freedom where people’s freedoms are equally maintained, not just violated whenever the sovereign feels like it.

## AT Levinas

# Extra

## Ripstein Weighing Card

Under equal freedom, only hindrances to initial hindrances of freedom are permissible – anything else violates the standard. **Ripstein**:[[19]](#footnote-19)

Second, Kant’s conception of coercion judges the legitimacy of any particular coercive act not in terms of its effects but against the background idea of a system of equal freedom. That is, unlike Bentham, he beings with the concept of a rule, but the rules in question govern the legitimate use of force in terms of reciprocal limits on freedom. Coercion is objectionable where it is a hindrance to a person’s right to freedom, but legitimate when it takes the form of hindering a hindrance to freedom. **To stop you from interfering with another person upholds the other’s freedom.** Using force to get the victim out of the kidnapper’s clutches involves coercion against the kidnapper, because it touches or threatens to touch him in order to advance a purpose, the freeing of the victim, to which he has not agreed. The use of force is rightful because an incident of the victim’s antecedent right to be free. The kidnapper hinders the victim’s freedom; forcibly freeing the victim hinders that hindrance, and in so doing upholds the victim’s freedom. In so doing, it *also* makes the kidnapper do what he should have done, that is, let the victim go, but its rationale is that it upholds the victim’s right to be free, not that it enforces the kidnapper’s obligation to release the victim. The use of force in this instance is an instance of the victim’s right to independence, and so is a consistent application of a system of equal freedom. If coercion is understood as justified if and only if it restricts a restriction on freedom, it does not need to be identified with a sanction. Aggression is coercive; defensive force is also coercive. The latter is not a further wrong that requires a special justification; it is just the protection of the defender’s freedom. The person using defensive force is neither sanctioning the aggressor nor carrying out a threat that was supposed to deter aggression. Kant’s claim that it is legitimate to use force to hinder hindrances to freedom thus incorporates his more general idea of a system of equal freedom. He does not start with the idea that it is always wrong to restrict the choice of another person, and then struggle to show that doing so is sometimes outweighed on balance, in the way that Bentham, for example, thinks that causing pain is always bad but legitimate when outweighed by a greater good produced. Instead, **the initial hindrance** of freedom **is wrong**ful **because [it is] inconsistent with** a system of **equal freedom; the act that cancels it is not a second wrong** that mysteriously makes a right, **because** the use of **force is only wrongful if inconsistent with reciprocal limits on freedom.** So **force that restores freedom is just** the **restoration of the original right.**

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7. http://vbriefly.com/side-bias/ [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Merriam Webster Dictionary, “affirm” [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2008.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
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13. (Makani, Executive Director of The Praxis Project, a nonprofit organization helping communities use media and policy advocacy to advance health equity and justice. “Changing the Rules: What Public Policy Means for Organizing” Colorlines 3.2) [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Alan Coverstone, Princeton High School, “An Inward Glance: A Response to Mitchell’s Outward Activist Turn,” 1995 www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm, acc 3-16-05//uwyo-ajl [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
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16. Allen Wood [professor at Stanford]. Kantian Ethics. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
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